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In organizational analysis it can be argued that ‘radical separatism’—in the guise of the original ‘agenda’ for
Radical Organization Theory (see Benson, 1977a; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980) or
more recently that for Critical Management Studies (see Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Fournier and Grey,
2000; Casey, 2002; Grey, 2004)—has failed to breach the hegemony of functionalist orthodoxy, and notably
so when it comes to practice. Given this failure, we speculate, upon the potential for a different emancipatory
approach, one based theoretically on the fluid process of ‘undecidability’. Unusually our approach attempts to
undermine the conventions of functionalist organization theory from within. In brief, we speculate upon the
adoption and enactment of Luce Irigaray’s (1985, 1991) strategy of mimicry as a means to illuminate the
notion of ‘excess’ in organization theory. To liberate the feminine, Irigaray mimics the symbolic representa-
tion of the female body to excess so as to expose the contradictions of phallocentric discourse. When applied
to organization theory, this sees a deliberate mimicking of critiques of radical separatism so as to make
explicit the latter’s imprisonment within functionalism. Through excessive mimicking of the functionalists’
critique, the radical/critical organization theorist may become cognizant of, but perhaps not so subjugated by,
the hegemony of functionalist discourse.
Key words: Excess; Mimicry; Oganization Theory; Luce Irigaray; Critical Management
INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that the conceptual/textual representation of organization theory and
analysis reflects a system of intellectual self-imprisonment. As a case analysis, it claims that
attempts by the early proponents of ‘radical separatism’ to release themselves from this
confinement resulted only in their recapture. We contend that this was largely inevitable,
given that radical separatism failed to break with the conventions of representation within
orthodox, systems-based or functionalist theories of organization. We argue further that this
assessment can be applied similarly to recent attempts to specify an agenda for ‘Critical
Management Studies’.
Given this contention, we wish to speculate upon a different approach for the liberation of
radical/critical theories of organization from the hegemony of what has traditionally been
termed the ‘functionalist orthodoxy’. Unusually however this form of liberation is realised
through disruption from within the conventions of orthodox organizational analysis. Our
approach sees Luce Irigaray’s (1985, 1991) philosophy of the enactment of textual mimicry
adopted to illuminate the notion of ‘excess’ of organization theory—‘otherness’; the ‘extra’;
that which is ‘situated beyond’. We wish to explore theoretically that which is predominantly
*E-mail: john.hassard@mbs.ac.uk
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146 I. ATKIN ET AL.
excluded as ‘excess’ by an empowered and hegemonic functionalist community. Through a
retrospective case analysis we suggest that the mimicry of functionalism’s representation of
the original attempt to establish ‘radical separatism’—namely, the Radical Organization
Theory agenda (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Burrell, 1980; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980)—
provides the conditions, if not the solution, to effect the radical/critical theorist’s escape. This
is an escape, via what Irigaray (1985) calls the ‘residue’, to the discourse of the ‘other’
(Cooper, 1983, 1990) in organizational analysis.1
ESCAPING THE CONFINES OF ORGANIZATION THEORY?
It is difficult to escape the authoritative discourse of organization theory. This is the outcome
of the theorist-author being confined within a chain of statements that represent the organiza-
tion. The predominant definition of the organization is ‘a circumscribed administrative-
economic function’ (Cooper and Burrell, 1988: 92). As such, the textual topography of
organization theory is a confined ‘inside’, a boundary of exclusion. As Pugh writes,
‘organization theory can be defined as the study of the structure, function and performance of
organizations, and the behaviour of groups and individuals within them’ (Pugh, 1990: ix,
emphasis added).
As intellectual capital, the orthodox concept of organization was described in Morgan’s
(1986) well-known book on metaphor as a fundamental construct of the ‘psychic prison’ of
management thought. It can be argued that increasingly this prison is guarded and managed
by officers of the academy of administrative sciences, and specifically of the (USA-based)
Academy of Management through its Divisions and associated journals. The prison metaphor
suggests that the ‘formal’ organization is a disciplined space, with the term formal being an
imperative that privileges ‘order’. For those sympathetic to radical/critical approaches to
management studies, this order is reproduced inter alia through the theories and methods of
functionalist organizational analysis (Cooper and Burrell, 1988: 109).
Cognizant of the hegemonic discourse of mainstream organization theory, the early propo-
nents of radical separatism (e.g., Benson, 1977a, 1977b; Goldman and Van Houten, 1977;
Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Burrell, 1980; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980) sought emancipation
through developing distinct intellectual gestures from those of functionalism. In their work,
emancipation was the outcome of an escape from the powerful institutional consensus of
systems theory. Thus, ‘the immediate need is for ‘paradigmatic closure’—a clear-cut
separation of radical organization theory from its orthodox functionalist counterpoint’
(Burrell, 1980: 92).
The motivation to establish a separate voice arose from the apparent under-development of
radical theories of organization (Burrell, 1980). This lack of a self-sustaining capacity was
based upon the tendency for radical theorists to become ensnared by the very concepts they
sought to reject. As the metaphors of orthodox theory remained the agency of mediation, the
radical theorist became influenced by the writings of ‘a community of scholars to whom [he
or she] is in many ways fundamentally opposed’ (ibid.: 91). Although these metaphors were
not directly identified by Burrell, they were indicative of modes of thought which enabled the
conventions of ‘the orthodoxy’ to ‘govern the terms of all debate’ (ibid.).
The primary task, therefore, of what was to become the main tangible product of radical
separatism, Radical Organization Theory, was to create a self-sustaining discourse built on
independent philosophical traditions. To effect a truly emancipatory analysis of organization,
organizations and organizing, radical theorists advocated a policy of intellectual separatism.
Without such sectarianism, it was felt that the metaphoric conventions of conservative
systems thinking would continue to govern the radical theorist’s self-concepts.
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EXCESS AND MIMESIS IN ORGANIZATION 147
ANALYTICAL OPENINGS: UNDECIDABILITY, INTER-TEXTUALITY AND THE 
INDEX
It can be argued, however, that the attempts by the early radical separatists to develop a
distinct theoretical position inevitably ran up against the ‘theorizing power’ (Clegg, 1979:
21) of organizational science’s conceptual/textual representations and institutions. This made
the development of an emancipatory discourse difficult, if not impossible, because radical
critiques were themselves defined as institutionally ‘orderly’. This orderliness was perhaps
inevitable, given the power of the academy over the professional life-world of the theorist.2
Although this may appear a mischievous claim—for during the past thirty years or so the
hegemony of functionalist theory has been challenged, decade-on-decade, by ‘alternative
agendas’ (from Silverman, 1970; through Burrell, 1980; to Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; and
recently Fournier and Grey, 2000; Casey, 2002; Grey, 2004, etc.)—we feel that it can be
justified through reference to analysis that takes recourse to the metaphor of ‘undecidability’.
To identify logical problems with attempts to escape from the confines of conceptual/textual
representation, we can draw upon conceptions of undecidability in, for example, Cooper’s
(1990) analysis of ‘organization/disorganization’, Derrida’s (1981) work on inter-textual
mime, and Art & Language’s (Harrison, 1991) construction of the ‘Index’.
To open up the undecidability of organizational analysis, Cooper (1990) argues that texts
on that discourse called organization theory represent the supplementary ‘organization of
organization’. He notes that often texts on organization are themselves organized according
to a set of normalized scientific and/or academic criteria. As the content of a study of organi-
zation—and the theoretical or methodological context that frames the text—are indistin-
guishable, it follows that a text does not strictly add information on the study of organization,
for it also produces statements on that which it designates to be organization. In this way, the
text, as supplementary ‘includes itself in the structure it seeks to analyse and understand,
therefore creating undecidability’ (ibid.: 197).
Textual undecidability however is not restricted to a single text. Derrida (1981) for
instance offers the example of a reading of Mallarme’s Mimique to illustrate the point. This
story revolves around a mime whose gestures imitate no tradition of mime, and whose
performance of a pierrot who murders his unfaithful wife appears to be unscripted; in sum an
original mime. Derrida’s reading, however, reveals the self-deceptions that have been hidden
within the text of this unscripted mime. This reading finds that at the moment Mallarme
begins his story it is, already, caught up within a chain of supplementary inscriptions.
To expand, Mallarme bases his story on a ‘second edition’ of a pamphlet. The author of the
pamphlet, Beissier, had been a witness to the mime of the murder five years previously. The
reader of Mallarme’s text is therefore confronted by a story that is already composed of
multiple writings and readings. Mallarme’s mime artist is not inventing the script, but is
rather a phase in a chain of textual representation and transmission. While Mallarme’s story
concerns an original mime, it must admit to the lack of an original foundation or logos.
Derrida’s reading of Mimique thus invokes the notion of an infinite chain of representations.
To prevent representations taking on the form of an infinite set of readings, it can be
argued by implication that the academies of administrative science (e.g., the annual meeting
and journals of the Academy of Management) control meaning by defining the limits of intel-
lectual authority. For example, while the editors of several highly-ranked journals may allow
scholars from outside their editorial boards to act as guest editors of special issues, those
guest editors may have no influence over initial desk rejections or choice of reviewers and act
only in regard to a small subset of papers already deemed acceptable by those entrusted to
respect journal ‘standards’. In effect, such special issues affirm rather than diminish central
control, guest editors being willing participants in a process of exclusion and subjugation
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148 I. ATKIN ET AL.
despite the seeming autonomy that guest editorship may imply. In everyday academic
discourse, this is achieved through specifying what shall count as the bounded networks of
inter-textuality.3
The control by the academy of both the textual representation of the concept ‘organization’
and the network of the inter-textual mimes through which it is expressed can be encapsulated,
we feel, in the notion of the ‘Index of Intellectual Capital’ (Harrison, 1991). We have appro-
priated this metaphor from the notion of indexes designed and constructed by the members of
the Art & Language movement. For Art & Language, it is the theorizing power of the Index
that enables the various textual statements made by its members about art to be connected
(ibid.). By extension to organization theory, the Index of Intellectual Capital represents a
repository for the textual materials of the academy of administrative science. The Index is the
ordering technology for referencing representations of a concept, and thus the means by
which the reproduction of a discourse is controlled. It brings together written materials in a
way compatible with its intentional object.
The Index, however, is not a passive technology, for while circumscribed it still allows
readers to add (within ‘reason’) representations through the cross-referencing of conceptual
chains. Through its ability to define what shall count as ‘authentic’ or ‘reasonable’ knowl-
edge, the Index plays a role similar to Eco’s librarian in The Name of the Rose (Eco, 1984:
37), who informs the monks in the scriptorium of partial chains of reference in order that
mysteries remain unsolved.
In seeking to develop an emancipatory alternative for organization analysis, therefore, the
aim of our analysis is largely to disrupt the hegemony of the Index of organization theory. It
can be argued that the way to disclose the conventions of ‘orthodoxy’ in organization theory
is through a breaching of its boundary characteristics. This is important for it makes known
the undecidable moment between what a text permits in meaning and what it constrains.
To explore the possibilities for an alternative emancipatory analysis, our method is to
invert the original incommensurability thesis of radical separatism and instead work from
within the conventions of orthodox organization theory. As the discourses and institutions of
orthodox organisation theory largely inhibit the realisation of a separatist analysis, we argue
that the liberation of the radical/critical theorist’s selfhood—the perceptible self-images of
what we might call an ‘extra-radical’ position—may arise from within its mirror image, as
represented by systems/functionalist analysis.4 These self-images will be articulated through
a reading of Luce Irigaray’s (1985, 1991) enactment of excessive mimicry.
Prior to this, however, it is necessary to consider that part of Irigaray’s work from which
the thesis on mimicry arises. Two objectives inform this consideration. The first is to intro-
duce, albeit in part, the writings of Irigaray to organization theory: an academic specialization
in which her work is little known despite some exceptions (see, for example, Burrell, 1992;
Calás and Smircich, 1991, 1996; Wolfram Cox and Minahan, 2004). The second is to identify
the mimetic gestures that Irigaray deploys in her use of mimicry in order that we may mime
the ‘excess’ of organization theory.5
IRIGARAY AND MIMICRY
In part, Irigaray’s work is concerned with the liberation of the feminine from phallocentric
structures of discourse. To do this Irigaray deliberately mimics the oppressive symbolic
representation of the female body to excess, so as to make explicit—by playful repetition—
woman’s exploitation through the representation of the feminine by masculine discourse.
The function of Irigaray’s mimetic gesturing, however, is not to overthrow the phallocen-
tric order, nor to elaborate a new theory of which woman would be the subject or the object.
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EXCESS AND MIMESIS IN ORGANIZATION 149
Less ambitiously, it is to emphasise the theoretical self-disruptions of ‘suspending its
[phallocentric discourse] pretension to the production of a truth and of a meaning that are
excessively univocal’ (Irigaray, 1991: 126). Through disrupting the phallocentric discourse,
it can be argued that Irigaray potentially opens up a set of conditions for altering women’s
status in society (Whitford, 1988: 110).
The intellectual location from which mimetic analysis emerges is the sexualization of
discourse. For Irigaray, it is primarily Freud’s work that portrays ‘the sexual indifference that
underlies the truth of any science, the logic of every discourse’ (Irigaray, 1991: 118). While
in this sense sexual indifference has a long history, Irigaray maintains that its effects are
hidden. In Irigaray’s reading of Freud, this covert indifference becomes apparent in the way
female sexuality is defined in masculine terms. The feminine is always described in terms of
‘lack’ or ‘deficiency’, as in the theory of penis envy.
The statements of Freud that describe feminine sexuality, therefore, fail to note that the
female might have its own specificity. Freud does not identify two sexes whose differences
are articulated in the act of intercourse or, more generally speaking, in the imaginary and
symbolic processes that regulate the workings of society and culture. Rather, the feminine is
defined as either a complement to the operation of male sexuality or, more commonly, as a
negative image that provides male sexuality with an unfailing phallic self-representation.
Irigaray suggests, however, that Freud, rather than making original statements about male
or female sexuality, is merely describing an actual state of affairs. As a ‘man of science’,
Freud accounts for sexuality without examining the contextualizing historical factors
(Irigaray, 1991: 119). He takes female sexuality as he sees it, and accepts this as normative. A
woman’s dissatisfactions—epitomized perhaps in the hysterical Dora—are artefacts of
individual histories whose resolution is achieved through women’s submission to a rapport
with the father-figure. The pathology of these cases is not questioned in relation to differing
styles of society or culture. The specific demands of women are thus silenced.
Freud’s account of this actual state of affairs, however, itself emerges from the sexualiza-
tion of discourse—for it is caught up within the presuppositions of the production of
discourse, presuppositions which Freud does not fully analyse. This demands a challenge to
such philosophical discourse ‘inasmuch as it constitutes the discourse on discourse’ (Irigaray,
1991: 122). The domination of this discourse derives, to a large extent, from its power to
reduce all other discourses to the ‘economy of the “Same”’ (ibid.: 123). Its fundamental
power of domination is to eradicate the differences between the sexes in systems that are self-
representative of the masculine subject.
Irigaray intends to disrupt such domination by opening-up the main figures of philosophi-
cal discourse—substance, subject, absolute knowledge, etc.—in order to make visible what
they have ‘borrowed’: ‘that is feminine, from the feminine, to make them ‘render up’ and
give back what they owe the feminine’ (Irigaray, 1991: 123). To accomplish this, the femi-
nine must disrupt the coherence of discursive statements whose very coherence hides the
conditions of their production. Coherence can only be maintained so long as it is not
interrogated through the process of interpretive re-reading.
In order to open up the ‘economy of the Same’, Irigaray calls for a re-enactment of each
figure of discourse. She argues that while woman as a ‘residue’ (Irigaray, 1985: 114) is
beyond a conceptual grasp—because she is defined as feminine by the masculine subject—
she nevertheless possesses the facility (’of the “perceptible” of “matter”’: Irigaray, 1991:
124) to recover ideas about herself which are elaborated in and by masculine logic. This
responsibility to ‘otherness’ is accessed through playing the mime of the historically assigned
feminine, which sees the feminine role assumed deliberately, so as to make visible, by repeti-
tion, that which is supposed to remain outside. By excessively interpreting and repeating the
way in which the feminine finds itself defined as lack, deficiency, or as the imitation of the
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150 I. ATKIN ET AL.
masculine subject, this gesture converts a form of exploitation into one of affirmation. For
woman, to play a mime is to try to rescue the place of her exploitation by discourse while also
challenging the authority of discourse in the reproduction of that exploitation. Such a chal-
lenge makes visible residue, or ‘excess’ (Irigaray, 1991) on the feminine side.
AN ‘EXTRA-RADICAL’ INTERVENTION?
It can be argued that Irigaray’s work presents the opportunity to develop what might be
termed an ‘extra-radical’ intervention. Theoretically this intervention sees excessive mimicry
employed as just one medium for opening up the extra of social life.
The catalyst for this extra-radical intervention is Irigaray’s comments on women’s exploi-
tation through the discourse of political economy. Irigaray (1991) asks how can women
analyze their own exploitation and inscribe their own demands within an order prescribed by
the masculine? For Irigaray, the demand for women’s equality and difference cannot be artic-
ulated by the acceptance of a choice between ‘class struggle’ and ‘sexual warfare’. This alter-
native serves only to minimize the question of the exploitation of women through a definition
of power of the masculine type; it also implies putting off a women’s politics until an
unknown date.
Expanding this theme, Irigaray argues anyway that the relationship between economic
class oppression and patriarchy has not been subject to sufficient dialectical analysis. She
claims that the first class opposition was that between men and women in monogamous
marriage. This opposition coincided with that of the oppression of the female sex by the
male. Although this early antagonism signifies a first movement in class history, its associ-
ated oppression still remains normative. Through the established monopolization of private
property, patriarchal order functions to the benefit of the head of the family. As a result,
women are exploited in most exchange operations, be they sexual, economic, social or
cultural. Irigaray (1991: 131) writes: ‘The use, consumption, and circulation of their sexual-
ized bodies underwrite the organization and the reproduction of the social order in which they
have never taken part as “subjects”’.
If this general relationship holds, how can women claim the right to speak and participate
in non-exploitative exchange? A woman’s social inferiority is reinforced and complicated by
the fact that she does not have a language except through reference to masculine systems of
representation. The feminine is never to be identified except by and for the masculine.
Such oppression does, however, present an opportunity for elaborating a feminist critique
of the patriarchal discourse. This is based on the disrupting enactment of mime outlined
earlier. A radical mime of political economy holds that women are in a position ‘outside’ of
the laws of exchange, even though they are included ‘inside’ them as commodities. This sets
in train a ‘discourse on discourse’ by a residue, woman, who is ostensibly beyond the concep-
tual boundary of political economy.
The mime is enacted through an excessive, yet seemingly playful, mimicking of the
dominant patriarchal discourse. Otherness is accessed through disrupting the coherence of
economic statements whose very coherence hides the condition of their production. A
radical mime is accomplished through playing to excess the role of the historically
assigned, exploitable female. The mimic muses excessively on what would become of the
symbolic process that governs society if it were not for the metaphysical exploitation of the
feminine ‘other’? Through excessive gestures of the masculine subject, exploitation is
converted into an affirmation of the economic position of the feminine. By mimicking
personal economic status, the subject becomes knowing of, but not subjugated by, the
objective situation.
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MIMESIS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
When this analysis is applied to what arguably has been a historically similar inequitable
relationship—that between mainstream organization theory and attempts to establish radical
separatism—it charts an undecidable analysis through the residues of the former’s represen-
tation of the latter. In concrete terms, these residues can be defined by excessively mimick-
ing, for example, the various functionalist critiques of radical separatism (see e.g.,
Donaldson, 1985, 1996; Pfeffer, 1993, 1995; McKelvey, 2003). As extravagant mimics of
themselves—at least as understood by the academy of administrative science—radical theo-
rists can become aware of, but not enslaved by, their own subordination. Excessive mimicry
can convert its otherness into an affirmation. As the radical theorist sets in motion this
process of self-radicalization, the authoritative conventions of functionalist organization
theory are terrorized.
A reading of one of the best known functionalist critiques of radical separatism scripts
such a mime. The contingency theorist Lex Donaldson (1985: 40–6) in his book In Defence
of Organization Theory: A Reply to the Critics considered Radical Organization Theory and
its associated sociological paradigm, radical-structuralism, actually to be commensurable
with structural-functionalism. This representation draws on what he reads to be a contrary
position within the writings of the ‘critics’ of organization theory—that factional and
catastrophic models of change are not necessarily incompatible within the functionalist
framework.
The critics’ position is basically that ‘radical’ structuralism and ‘functional’ structuralism
arise from distinct theories of society. The former suggests deep connections between social
structures and radical change: the latter a relationship between social formations and regu-
lated order (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 400). Donaldson, however, counterpoises these
differences with the actual comments made in the critical literature. Specifically, he cites
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979: 66) continuum of change in system theory models, where ‘the
mechanical, organismic and morphogenic models are consistent with a perspective character-
istic of the functionalist paradigm; the…[factional and catastrophic models]…are more
characteristic of the radical structuralist paradigm’. It is the definition of factional and
catastrophic models that provides Donaldson with the means to dispose of the radical ‘other’
through reconciliation of radical-structuralism and structural-functionalism. His vehicle for
achieving this is a reading of Merton (1975).
Merton argues that the concepts of contradiction (from Marxism) and dysfunction (from
structural-functionalism) are complementary. To make these two concepts commensurable,
and thus to bring change into the social system, Donaldson makes similar assertions. He
begins by writing that the outputs of one sub-system may be dysfunctional for other parts. In
this way, ‘the essential notion of conflict has been introduced’ (Donaldson, 1985: 40,
emphasis added).
Subsequently Donaldson postulates that such ‘flows’ of functioning between system parts
will increasingly produce dysfunctions which ‘overstrain’ the system, the outcome being that
the breakdown of the system is followed by its subsequent reorganization. This allows
Donaldson to provide an account of contradiction and crisis in ‘systems rather than Marxian
terms’ (ibid.: 41).
It is Donaldson’s next move, however, which opens his text for the enactment of a radical
mime. Having reduced contradiction and dysfunction to comparable meanings, he
ambitiously attempts to subsume radical structuralism within a structural-functionalism
framework. For Donaldson, radical-structuralism concerns the historically specific structures
of feudalism and capitalism and the change from one to the other. As such, ‘[I]t should be
seen as a sub-type of structural-functionalism which deals with those historical issues and
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which posits crisis and revolutionary change as the mechanisms of transition’ (ibid.,
emphasis added). Donaldson thus facilitates the incorporation of radical structuralism as a
sub-set into the structural-functionalist framework, the very notion to which the critics object.
Following the path laid by Irigaray (1991), it is possible to open this text to perceptible
residues so as to enable a responsibility to otherness in a way that disrupts the conventional
discourse of orthodox organization theory. Here, that which is ‘perceptible’ is the conceptual
mechanism of the ‘flows’ between systems parts.
Donaldson’s elucidation of flow begins with an attempt to make two quotations in Burrell
and Morgan (1979) complementary—one by Radcliffe-Brown from the functionalist para-
digm, the other by Rex from the radical-structuralist paradigm: 
The concept of function as defined thus involves the notion of a structure consisting of a set of relations
amongst unit entities, the community of the structure being maintained by a life process made up of the activi-
ties of the constituent units. (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952: 180, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 52, original
emphasis)
[S]ocial systems may be thought of as involving conflict situations at central points…. The existence of such a
situation tends to produce not a unitary but a plural society, in which there are two or more classes…. The
activities of the members [of the classes]…must be explained by reference to the group’s interests in the
conflict situation. (Rex, 1961: 129, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 353, original emphasis)
For Donaldson, while these statements are not identical, once their terminological differences
have been stripped away the only issue that remains is the pervasiveness of negative flows in
the social system. The flows between parts can be positive or negative. Positive flows are
those that assist the continuation and development of the recipient unit entity: negative flows
impair continuation and development. A negative relationship between two entities amounts
to a ‘situation of conflict’ (Donaldson, 1985: 42), with the entities involved in a conflict
situation being classes.
Donaldson argues that the only part of the radical structuralist paradigm that now seems
inconsistent with structural-functionalism is the argument that negative relationships between
unit entities (classes) are a pervasive and persistent characteristic of the social system. To
overcome this difficulty, Donaldson suggests that the problem is not a fundamental category
difference, but is rather a ‘matter of degree’ (ibid.: 43). Furthermore, he argues that this
‘degree’—the balance of negative or positive flows, the variation between capitalist societies
because of this balance, and the relative change over time—can be tested by empirical means.
To write, however, that change as flow is a ‘matter of degree’ is to close off or give value to
the level of positive or negative flow; for to close off and give coherence to change cannot
encapsulate all change. Such argumentation is a reduction of that which is always a residue or
excess.
UNDECIDABLITY AND THE ZERO DEGREE
To transform Donaldson’s decidability into mimetic undecidability, we return to Cooper
(1990), who—from a reading of Levi-Strauss (1950, 1966, 1979), Simmel (1965, 1980) and
Derrida (1978)—offers an explanation of the undecidability of this excess, or the ‘zero
degree’ (Cooper, 1990: 182–3).
The zero degree amounts to pervading undecidablity: an excess ‘of no specific order, orga-
nization or direction’ (ibid.: 182). Cooper draws upon Derrida’s (1978: 278–93) notion that
structure—and Cooper adds ‘organization’—is conceived by tradition in a limited form, this
being the presence of a ‘fixed centre of point of origin’ (Cooper, 1990: 183). In Cooper’s
reading of Derrida, this centre has two functions: one is to orient and balance the structure in
a coherent way; the other, and more important, function, is for the principle of the structure to
limit ‘the play of the structure’ (Derrida, 1978: 278–9, quoted in Cooper, 1990: 183). The
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centre’s ability to organize the structure allows for the play of elements inside the ‘structural-
ity of the structure’ (Derrida, 1978: 278).
The process of centering, however, both opens up and closes off play; in that to close off
play it must exile from itself the play that is more than the ‘structurality’ of structure. As the
means of a responsibility to act, the flows of negative change are played to excess as a
responsibility to otherness. That is, the flow of change as a matter of degree is always,
inasmuch as it is perceptible, an excess—the zero degree. Not everything, therefore, is
carried along with the flow, for a residue or excess always remains outside the bounded
frame of the inside of the organization.
Cooper (1990) suggests that the frame differentiates between an ordered inside and a disor-
dered outside. The former corresponds to organization and the latter to disorganization.
Cooper’s specific working through of the framing of the boundary between the binary pairing
‘system and environment’ takes place within a clearly defined framework. The function of
the frame is to privilege the system: ‘the boundary belongs to the system and not to the envi-
ronment’ (ibid.: 170). Indeed ‘in its most fundamental sense organization is the appropriation
of order out of disorder’ (ibid.: 172).
Through his reading of Derrida (1978), Cooper motions a further development: that the order
of the inside of the boundary is attainable if the outside or disorganization is an excess or a
supplement. In its desire to be complete, the order of organization discards the surplus. But
this cannot be complete, for without the surplus of disorder it has a lacuna. This lacuna can
only be filled by the disorder of the undesired supplement necessarily constituting the meaning
of the inside. Without the disorder of the outside, the order of the inside is meaningless.
In Donaldson (1985), however, we are confronted with the blunt, decidable assertion that
when radical structuralism is adopted as an organization theory it avoids any excess in terms
of the ideological representation of organization. While this manoeuvre allows structural-
functionalism and radical structuralism to be presented as complementary, it also reveals the
undecidable moment of their relationship. This attempt at commensurability or subsumption
sets in motion the image of their incommensurability, which stems from the differing levels
of analysis that each would address. While the Index of orthodox organization theory prima-
rily locates characteristics of administrative structures, that of radical-structuralism refer-
ences economic and political change at the societal level. Thus as a form of organizational
analysis, the dynamic of radical-structuralism is to establish significance in terms of large
scale political dislocation. Donaldson’s argument falters in that the undecidable character of
their reconciliation requires the subordination of orthodox organization theory to the
principle of organizational analysis as a means of revealing conflict and change in the wider
society. For Donaldson this is anathema.
THE FATE OF RADICAL SEPARATISM
Conversely, a reading of the attempt by radical separatists to develop an emancipatory orga-
nization theory also reveals similar mimetic tensions. Previously it was noted that Burrell
(1980) made a series of exploratory moves in line with advocating radical-structuralism as a
genuine paradigmatic alternative to an orthodox organization theory ‘which ubiquitously
confronts us’ (ibid.: 98). For Burrell, a radical structuralist paradigm has no place for the
notion of a social system that is open to its environment, or for related discussions of external
forces and causal flows. This is because the totality draws the boundary around that which is
theoretically relevant. The totality does not take recourse to that form of systems thinking
which asserts that the social whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Instead an adequate
theory of the part is a theory of the totality, just as a theory of the totality is a theory of the part.
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Burrell’s text, however, only rehearses the ideological conventions of the representation of
bounded organization. He assumes that in ‘late capitalism’ the mechanism of totality integra-
tion is the organization itself, for it is currently found at the point of production where labour
and capital meet. This mechanism has in fact taken various forms. Under early capitalism the
role of integrating the social formation or social relations of production was fulfilled by the
family. Just as the family was replaced as the primary unit of production, in the future
organization may be replaced as the mechanism of totality integration.
Furthermore, as the current mechanism for totality integration, we know that the organiza-
tion must create an inside-outside boundary of its own. Just as Donaldson’s (1985) scripting
of the mime of radical-structuralism could not account for the residue of flow, so this bound-
ary cannot account for the excess of exploitation and oppression that radical structuralism
tries to give voice. Exploitation belongs to and is maintained by the ‘inside’ of the organiza-
tion—through the established social relations of capital and labour. The inside is privileged
over the outside or other.
It can be argued, therefore, that radical separatism, in the form of the original project of
Radical Organization Theory, ultimately failed its manifesto, for its rhetoric invoked the
image of established and orthodox social systems concepts. Although radical separatists
claimed to develop an autonomous political space, that space took recourse ultimately to
many functionalist conventions. As its aim was primarily to change the distribution of orga-
nizational representation, it left the power structure intact (see Gergen, 1992). Because its
discourse was structured essentially by systems concepts, radical separatism was largely
‘intra-institutional’ (Derrida, 1983: 16) and could almost be described as an ‘orthodox-
radical’ approach.
In many ways, the same accusation can be levelled at its direct descendent, Critical
Management Studies, notably over its failure to influence organizational practice. Despite
much internal debate, the development of Critical Management Studies from pre-conference
workshop status to that of an Interest Group within the main north American Academy of
Management conference program further illustrates the point. In Europe, the Critical
Management Studies Conference may have remained independent of the more mainstream
academy, but its rapid growth (also evident in the US counterpart) has meant that it is now a
major event on the European management conference circuit. That there is much common
membership between the two groups and that this membership consists of many professors
located, if uncomfortably, within traditional business schools and teaching into MBA
programs has not gone unnoticed. That CMS has recently reaffirmed critical realism as a
philosophical underpinning, even though subject to the usual contestations, may be of greater
concern. In sum, it is not surprising that there have been calls for greater participation of crit-
ical scholars within the main divisions of the Academy of Management rather than through
its Critical Management Studies Interest Group. Thus, although radical separatism has sought
emancipation and otherness, it can be argued that it largely remains subject to the institu-
tional protocols and symbolic representations of the academy of ‘orthodox’ organization
theory.
CONCLUSIONS
Developing a sensitivity towards the ‘extra’, ‘excess’ or ‘other’ of organizational life, the
paper argues that the intellectual products of those who subscribe to a philosophy of radical
separatism serve mainly to bolster the hegemonic conventions of orthodox/mainstream repre-
sentations of organizational analysis. To a large extent this results from such writers failing to
disrupt the inside/outside boundary of ‘organization’. It has been argued, theoretically, that a
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sense of self-emancipation can be achieved through disrupting orthodox conventions of
representation and giving ‘otherness’ a voice. To achieve this, the circumscribed boundary of
orthodox organizational analysis must be terrorized. Through reference to Irigaray’s (1991)
work on mimicry, we have suggested that the excess that the boundary cannot contain
informs a responsibility to act on behalf of those who are ‘othered’.
NOTES
1. This paper extends some earlier thoughts by the authors on radical separatism expressed in Boje, Gephart and
Thatchenkery (1996).
2. At face value, however, the various radical perspectives do appear to possess a common commitment to social
theories of the political left, and thus opposition to the managerialist pedagogy of functionalist organization
theory. A commitment to political change is indeed basic to radical theory. The primary purpose of, for
example, radical structuralism is to clarify the status of late capitalism. Knowledge gained is to be used in the
interests of the ‘exploited social majority’, because radical theory ‘should always have discontinuous
revolutionary change of such societies as [its] ultimate political goal’ (Burrell, 1980: 90).
3. In appropriating Derrida’s work in this way, we note that considerable violence has been inflicted, as his
concern is with a disruption of the Platonic notion of mimesis—as revealed truth—whereas our own is the
hegemony of inter-textual representation.
4. For organization theory, the conceptual imagery of systems orthodoxy is rendered from functionalist social
theory. Through this association many of the criticisms made against functionalism also hold for systems
theory.
5. Fundamental to the ethics of a responsibility to otherness is a sympathetic following of the texts of those who
are themselves the other. This is necessary so as to explore the oppression of the other while respecting the
integrity of political discourses from the margins. To terrorize the conventions of orthodox organization theory,
we will appropriate the gestures of Irigaray’s mimicry through which she retrieves the feminine other.
References
Alvesson, M. and Willmott, H. (Eds.) (1992) Critical Management Studies, London: Sage.
Benson, J.K. (1977a) Organizations: A dialectical view, Administrative Science Quarterly, 18(1), 3–16.
Benson, J.K. (1977b) Innovation and crisis in organizational analysis, Sociological Quarterly 18(4), 229–49.
Boje, D., Gephart, R. and Thatchenkery, T. (Eds.) (1996) Postmodern Management and Organization Theory,
London: Sage.
Burrell, G. (1980) Radical Organization Theory. In: D. Dunkerley and G. Salaman (Eds.) The International
Yearbook of Organization, 1979, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Burrell, G. (1992) The organization of pleasure. In: M. Alvesson and H. Willmott (Eds.) Critical Management
Studies, London: Sage.
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology
of Corporate Life, London: Heinemann.
Calás, M. and Smircich, L. (1991) Voicing seduction to silence leadership, Organization Studies, 12(4), 567–602.
Calás, M. and Smircich, L. (1996) From “the woman’s” point of view: Feminist approaches to organization studies.
In: S.R. Clegg, C. Hardy, and W.R. Nord (Eds.) Handbook of Organization Studies, London: Sage.
Casey, C. (2002) Critical Analysis of Organizations, London: Sage.
Clegg, S. (1979) The Theory of Power in Organizations, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Clegg, S. and Dunkerley, D. (1980) Organizations, Class and Control, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Cooper, R. (1983) The other: A model of human structuring. In: G. Morgan (Ed.) Beyond Method, Beverley Hills:
Sage.
Cooper, R. (1990) Organization/disorganization. In: J. Hassard and D. Pym (Eds.) The Theory and Philosophy of
Organizations: Critical Issues and New Perspectives, London: Routledge.
Cooper, R. and Burrell, G. (1988) Modernism, postmodernism and organizational analysis: An introduction,
Organization Studies, 10(4), 479–502.
Derrida, J. (1978) Writing and Difference, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Derrida, J. (1981) Dissemination, London: The Athlone Press.
Derrida, J. (1983) The principles of reason: The university in the eyes of its pupils, Diacritics, 19(3), 3–20.
Donaldson, L. (1985) In Defence of Organization Theory: A Reply to the Critics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Donaldson, L. (1996) For Positivist Organization Theory, London: Sage.
Eco, U. (1984) The Name of the Rose, London: Picador.
Fournier, V. and Grey, C. (2000) At the critical moment: Conditions and prospects for critical management studies,
Human Relations, 53(1), 7–32.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
8:0
7 2
5 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
156 I. ATKIN ET AL.
Gergen, K. (1992) Organization theory in the postmodern era. In: M. Reed and M. Hughes (Eds.) Re-thinking
Organization: New Directions in Organization Theory and Analysis, London: Sage.
Goldman, P. and Van Houten, D. (1977) Managerial strategies and the worker: A Marxist analysis of bureaucracy,
Sociological Quarterly, 18(4), 108–25.
Grey, C. (2004) Reinventing business schools: The contribution of critical management education, Academy of
Management Learning and Education, 3(2): 178–86.
Harrison, C. (1991) Essays on Art & Language, Oxford: Blackwell.
Irigaray, L. (1985) This Sex Which is Not One, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press.
Irigaray, L. (1991) The power of discourse and the subordination of the feminine. In: M. Whitford (Ed.) The Irigaray
Reader, Oxford: Blackwell.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1950) Introduction. In: M. Mauss, Sociologie et Anthropologie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1966) The Savage Mind, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1979) The Raw and the Cooked, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
McKelvey, W. (2003) From fields to science: Can organization studies make the transition?. In: R. Westwood and S.
Clegg (Eds.) Debating Organization, London: Sage.
Merton, R.K. (1975) Structural analysis in sociology. In: P.M. Blau (Ed.) Approaches to the Study of Social
Structures, New York: Free Press.
Morgan, G. (1986) Images of Organization, London: Sage.
Pfeffer, J. (1993) Barriers to the advance of organization science: Paradigm development as a dependent variable,
Academy of Management Review, 18(4), 599–620.
Pfeffer, J. (1995) Mortality, reproducibility, and the persistence of styles of theory, Organization Science, 6(6), 681–6.
Pugh, D.S. (1990) Introduction to the third edition. In: D.S. Pugh (Ed.) Organization Theory: Selected Readings, 3rd
Edition, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1952) Structure and Function in Primitive Society, London: Cohen & West.
Rex, J. (1961) Key Problems in Sociological Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Silverman, D. (1970) The Theory of Organizations, London: Heinemann.
Simmel, G. (1965) The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays, New York: Teachers’ College Press.
Simmel, G. (1980) Essays on Interpretation in Social Science, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Whitford, M. (1988) Luce Irigaray’s critique of rationality. In: M. Griffiths and M. Whitford (Eds.) Feminine
Perspectives in Philosophy, London: Macmillan.
Wolfram Cox, J. and Minahan, S. (2004) Unravelling Woomera: lip sewing, morphology and dystopia, Journal of
Organizational Change Management, 17(3), 292–301.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
8:0
7 2
5 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
